[7/11] Left Wing Extremism: Counter operations by Center/State government

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division
This Division was created w.e.f. October 19, 2006 in the MHA to effectively address the Left Wing Extremist insurgency in a holistic manner. The LWE Division implements security related schemes aimed at capacity building in the LWE affected States. The Division also monitors the LWE situation and counter-measures being taken by the affected States. The LWE Division coordinates the implementation of various development schemes of the Ministries/Departments of Govt. of India in LWE affected States. The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh are considered LWE affected, although in varying degrees.


Role and Functions of the Division 
• Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in LWE affected States.
• Reimbursing security related expenditure incurred by the LWE affected States under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme.
• Providing assistance to the State Governments for construction/ strengthening of fortified police stations under the Scheme for Construction/ Strengthening of 400 Fortified Police Stations in LWE affected districts.
• Providing funds to the CAPFs for Civic Action Programme in LWE affected areas.
• Reviewing the security situation in the LWE affected States and issuing advisories to the State Governments concerned..
• Providing assistance to State Governments towards capacity building to combat LWE.
• Coordinating implementation of LWE related Schemes of other Central Ministries for LWE affected Districts.


The Government’s approach is to deal with Left Wing Extremism in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception management.


In dealing with this decades-old problem, it has been felt appropriate, after various high-level deliberations and interactions with the State Governments concerned, that an integrated approach aimed at the relatively more affected areas would deliver results. With this in view, a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Left Wing Extremist violence has been made and 106 districts in ten States have been taken up for special attention with regard to planning, implementation and monitoring various interventions.


However, 'Police' and 'Public Order' being State subjects, action on maintenance of law and order lies primarily in the domain of the State Governments. The Central Government closely monitors the situation and supplements and coordinates their efforts in several ways. These include providing-
1. Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA);
These troops are attached to police station or to district police. They don’t have specific job assigned to them and hence doesn’t have autonomy. They just act as support system to state police. Also, centre has deployed there CoBRA – Commando Battalion for Resolute Actions are also deployed. These are elite forces specializing in guerrilla and jungle warfare
2. sanction of India Reserve (IR) battalions,
3. setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) schools;
4. modernisation and upgradation of the State Police and their Intelligence apparatus under the Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces (MPF scheme)-
Strengthening the intelligence mechanism: This includes intelligence sharing through Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) at the central level and State Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) at the subsidiary level on 24×7 basis.
5. re-imbursement of security related expenditure under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme;
6. providing helicopters for anti-Naxal operations,
7. assistance in training of State Police through the Ministry of Defence,
8. the Central Police Organisations and the Bureau of Police Research and Development;
9. sharing of Intelligence;
10. facilitating inter-State coordination;
11. assistance in community policing and civic action programmes etc.


The underlying philosophy is to enhance the capacity of the State Governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a concerted manner.


This has time and again created chain and command problems. There have been ego problems and confusion between operations of two forces. Further these forces are commanded by Inspectors who are in their 50’s and don’t have any experience of similar operations, knowledge of terrain and intelligence support.


While army is involve in training of CRPF and State police troops, yet it is not involved in operations.


Experts are overwhelmingly against involvement of Army because of following reasons:
1. Army is option for the last resort. Currently problem is not lack of physical capacity of our police/ paramilitary forces, but intelligence support is certainly lacking. In absence of this Army will end up achieving very little and deterrent aura of Army reservoir will be lost.
2. Further, Maoist will use this deployment and some associated developments as deliberate abuse of power by government against poor tribals. This may earn Maoist sympathy of tribals.
3. Our Army is already over stretched and if we start using it internally, our frontiers will be quite vulnerable. This we can’t afford as we know nature of our neighbours.


It may be asked that, then why AFSPA is implemented in J&K and North East areas, but not in Maoist affected area? This is because they already are on international borders and anti-state elements there are actively being supported by foreign power.


SAMADHAN-
The Home Minister enunciated an operational strategy ‘SAMADHAN’ to fight Left Wing Extremism. The elements of this strategy are
1. S for Smart Leadership,
2. A for Aggressive Strategy,
3. M for Motivation and Training,
4. A for Actionable Intelligence,
5. D for Dashboard-based Key Result Areas and Key Performance Indicators,
6. H for Harnessing Technology, 
7. A for Action Plan for Each Theatre and
8. N for No access to Financing.


1. S – Smart Leadership-
-  You also know that effective leadership can lead to any desired outcome. A leader is the one who makes the impossible possible, converts failure to success and defeat to victory.
- The key properties of ‘Smart Leadership’ are:
Vision, Mission, Passion and Self belief.


- A leadership full of self confidence should have a solid vision on how he would envisage the challenges of the future and prepare his team and energise his team to a mission mode, in order to achieve his objectives. To make his team secure, disciplined and victorious, should be of paramount importance for him.
- The success stories of many police officers in India are inscribed in the minds of the common people, as to how they kept their teams alive with energy. On the Left Wing Extremism front, we also need such leadership, who despite adversity, keep their jawans full of enthusiasm and teach them only to win.
- Be it Central Forces or the district police, they will have to work under a coordinated strategy and plan. The most important thing is that the officers will have to lead from the front. Success in this regard cannot be achieved only by sitting in Delhi, Ranchi or Raipur.
- Unified Co-Ordination and Command is needed in the LWE Front. Along with Strategic Command, Unified Command is also required at the Operational and Tactical Level. Intelligence sharing is important too.


2. A-Aggressive Strategy-
You are aware that in the last three years, Government has seen good results from the Multi-Pronged Strategy against Left Wing Extremism. Statistics of violence from 2014 to 2016 indicates this. In the year 2016, 150 percent Left Wing Extremists were killed as compared to the previous year 2015, and arrests and surrender taken together has seen an increase of 47 percent.


- In the year 2016, Left Wing Extremists have suffered heavy losses. They also mentioned this in their statements and documents. It is also true that Left Wing Extremists are constantly trying to take action against the security forces to increase the morale of their cadres, and undoubtedly the incident of the Burkapal of Sukma is one such example.


- Even in the year 2017, figures show that LWE  incidents have decreased by 23.3 percent (377 to 289). But two to three incidents have occurred in which Security Forces have suffered heavy losses. Therefore, it is necessary that an analysis of these events is carried out, in order to assess the reasons as to why  such incidents occur. The first session of the meeting will analyse the mechanism in place to combat Left Wing Extremism and other related issues.


- Today, we need to consider whether to react only after the occurrence of such events? Should our role not be Proactive?
- Learning from the old incidents, we need to bring aggression into our policy. Aggression in thinking, Aggression in strategy, Aggression in deployment of forces, Aggression in operations, Aggression in development and Aggression in road construction.
- We will have to be cautious that extremely defensive deployment may result in reduction of operational offensive.
- We have to consider that although the figures of the surrenders of the Left Wing Extremisms are increasing, but whether benefit of intelligence from these surrendered LWE cadres is being derived.
- We must ensure that the States take the ownership of LWE operations and CAPFs cooperate with them fully. At the same time, the forces on the Ground level should not lack leadership. "Unity of Purpose" and "Unity of Action" are essential for the success of operations.


3. M - Motivation and Training -
- The Government has superior resources, training, technology, than the Left Wing Extremists. But there is a need for better coordinated efforts to counter the strategy of the LWE.
- Success on this front cannot be achieved only by being emotional in this regard. The right vision, right strategy, efficient use of resources, knowledge of enemy strengths and weaknesses, training of their security forces, their facilities and arrangements of tools are necessary for success. So we have to consider all these issues correctly, point wise. Today's meeting is important in this regard.
- In the camps where the security forces are residing, proper facilities of power, water, connectivity should be provided so that the Security Forces may remain stress free. They should also be able to contact their family as per requirement.
- In addition to information about the place of posting, security forces should also have knowledge of language, dialects, traditions and culture so that they can adapt to the local conditions and earn the trust of the local people.
- Security forces must adhere to Standard Operating Procedures so that they are conscious about their own security.


4. A-Actionable Intelligence
- To develop actionable intelligence it is important that all intelligence agencies and security forces establish a good network with local people.
- Surrendered LWE cadre should be used for intelligence collection to the maximum possible.
- In comparison to Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, the Technical Intelligence Inputs in Bastar Zone of Chhattisgarh are very low and the reason for this is only 20 percent effective connectivity in Bastar. It is only 4 percent in a district like Sukma. There is a need to create special action plans through the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) to increase connectivity across the entire LWE affected area.
- From the point of view of Intelligence, I believe that there is a need to depute Shadow Intelligence Officers to trace the prominent targets associated with Left Wing Extremism.
- There is a need to establish specific procedures between State Police and Central Forces for the exchange and use of intelligence.


5. D-Dashboard based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas)
- Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Result Areas (KRAs) should be determined both for the State Police and the CAPFs. This would not only help to assess the preparedness but also their performance, regular progress of its unit and individual abilities of each police officer.


6. H - Harnessing Technology -
- We are all aware that Technology is a Force Multiplier.
- Many technologies including Space, IT and Communication have brought revolutionary changes in the world. Many new techniques are also being used in dealing with law and order and the crime. On the LWE  front, there is a need to use more of such latest technologies.
Now I would like to talk about the use of some Cutting edge Technologies : -
- Currently the use of the UAV is sub-optimal, that needs to be augmented both by numbers and by use in the right place.
- The Mini UAVs are extremely useful. Therefore, they should be procured and available in more quantities. We must try that with every battalion there must be atleast one UAV / Mini UAV.
- We need to use high resolution PTZ Cameras, GPS Tracking, Handheld Thermal Imaging, Radar, Satellite Image etc.
- We also know that Left Wing Extremists mostly use looted weapons. In order to prevent this, it would be advisiable to have 
- Trackers in Weapons,
- Biometrics in smart gun triggers.
- Trackers should also be embedded in Shoes, BP jackets etc.
- In addition, Unique identification numbers should also be used in Gelatine and other explosive materials.
- States that do not have expertise in such state of the art technology, the Central Government can assist in this regard.


7. A-Action plan for each theatre-
- You are also aware that the situation of Left Wing Extremism in different States is not the same.
- In different States, to fight Left extremism, there is a need to fight on multiple fronts and to create a specific action plan for each of such fronts, in order to achieve success on a systematic basis.
- There is a need to create separate short-term, medium-term, long-term strategies, whose goals and deadlines are clearly defined. The Implementation should be done on a Mission Mode defining the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for continuous monitoring and Key Result Areas (KRAs), that should also be aligned with these strategies.


8. N-No access to financing-
- It is well-known that economic resources play an important role in any war or any such exercise, because when money is available, only then will it be possible to buy, eat, drink and possess ammunition and weapons. Therefore, choking the financial resources of the LWE is the most basic mantra in this fight.
- I would like to remind you how the US took the 9/11 incident as a challenge, in order to prevent it from repeating itself. In the report it was stated that the 9/11 incident was not a "failure of intelligence but the failure of Imagination". Therefore, the 'Samadhan' which we have discussed today has inbuilt potential for imagination. We have to work on imaginative thinking on the whole situation so that we can "Out Think" and "Out Manoeuvre"  the LWE.
- We have come a long way in defeating the fight with Left Wing Extremists. In the remote areas, our young men are constantly working for the development and protection of the area endangering their lives. In the yagya for the security of the country many soldiers have been martyred. I am convinced that their martyrdom will not go in vain. That day is not far when this mindless violence will be completely finished and once again the atmosphere of peace and prosperity will prevail and people will rapidly join the main stream along with enjoying the fruits of development.
- Now I would like to also mention the ongoing Security related Assistance given to the State Governments by the Government of India. Under this, 118 Battalions of CAPF have been deployed in the States. Besides, States have been given the sanction for IR Battalions and SIRB to strengthen the security Apparatus of the States. 10 CoBRA Battalions have been deployed, in addition to handle this kind of LWE issues.
- In the last few years, the Ministry of Home Affairs has assisted the States through various schemes for Capacity Building. Under the SRE Scheme, reimbursement of security related expenses, such as ex-gratia, transportation, training, honorarium for SPOs etc., was done by the Central Government in 106 districts of 10 States. In the financial year 2016-17, the Home Ministry has reimbursed Rs 210 crore.
- Under the Special Infrastructure Scheme, 122.13 crores was given to strengthen the special forces of 6 States. Apart from this, a sum of 24 crores was provided for setting up 16 CIAT schools in 6 States. More than 4000 police personnel are being trained every year by Army and Greyhounds.
- Similarly, under the Fortified Police Station Scheme, the Central Government has made available Rs. 624 crores to the States for the construction of 400 Fortified Police Stations in 10 States.
- LWE Affected States have been sanctioned 56 IRB and 10 SIRB. States have been given these sanctions to increase their force resources. The SIRB is a major step towards providing security for the State's infrastructure projects, especially in these sensitive areas. But now 20 IR Battalion and 06 SIRB are yet to be raised with both the security and engineering components. In addition, engineering components of 02 SIRBs are pending.
- The Home Ministry has provided support to security forces for other facilities such as Helicopters, UAVs etc. From time to time, the amount required for the CRPF is being provided by the GOI for the basic facilities, due to lack of resources of the State Governments.
- We assure the States that we will continue to provide full support to them for their capacity building and training needs. Intelligence sharing and deployment of Central security forces will continue as per requirement. But the States must take initiative to conduct Operations and use Resources optimally.
- I have full confidence that today's deliberations will be fruitful and we will be able to realize the vision of our Hon’ble Prime Minister of building a Left Wing Extremism free India.”


Grey Hound Police
The Greyhounds are an elite commando force of Andhra Pradesh, India created to combat left wing extremists. It is considered the best anti Naxalite force in the country, even above the CRPF’s CoBRA which has more men, budget and better arms than the Greyhounds. Greyhound is a simple but effective organization and recruits the best of the best from the Andhra Pradesh Police. The Force is also known for its guerrilla approach and its functioning in the field, which is near similar to that of the Maoists. Greyhound commandos often exclaim that their strength does not lie in them being a special force with special training, but it lies in the fact that it is more of a guerrilla force than a special force. The commandos of Greyhounds undergo rigorous training and have a strict day to day combat regime. They are highly paid, motivated and well-armed.


Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhound naxal fighting force along with infrastructure development and effective surrender and rehabilitation policy has also proved effective.  Other elements in the Andhra Pradesh model include:
• Culture of police leadership
• Sound knowledge of local terrain
• Incentives to police for good work
• Operations based on local intelligence
• Grass roots involvement in anti-Naxal operations


It may be recalled that on October 24 last, about 30 members, including top Maoist leaders, were killed in an alleged EOF with Greyhounds of the Andhra Pradesh police.


In the exchange of fire, almost the entire top leadership of the Malkangiri-Koraput-Visakhapatnam Border division and part of the Andhra-Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee of the CPI (Maoist), were wiped out. They include leaders such as Bakuri Venkata Ramana alias Ganesh, Kistayya alias Daya, Gangadhar and Prithviraj alias Munna.


Operation Green Hunt
It was the name used by the Indian media to describe the “all-out offensive” by government of India’s paramilitary forces and the state’s forces against the Naxalites. The operation is believed to have begun in November 2009 along five states in the Red Corridor.
Recent attack on CRPF battalion is said to be in retaliation against this operation. 


Salwa Judum
So called People’s movement was named Salwa Judum, to mean, “Peace hunt” in the local Gondi tribal dialect. The movement was launched by a few villagers angered by Naxal interference in the local trade of tendu leaves (used for making bidis).


However, later on, it was alleged that maintaining law and order in Dantewada and Bastar was outsourced to the Salwa Judum cadres, some of them as young as 15–16 years in age. Some 5000 such cadres were made Special Police Officers (SPOs), given a rifle each and paid Rs 1500–2000 a month. Poorly trained, ill equipped and immature, some of the Salwa Judum cadres themselves looted many tribal villages. It resulted in civil war like situation in these regions. Last year, Supreme Court ruled that this movement is unconstitutional and only state has responsibility of maintaining law and order.


Sandesh (Bihar)
Sandesh block in Bihar has seen a gradual elimination of Naxalites. The most important factor which proved instrumental in dismantling naxal dominance was the panchayat elections initiated in Bihar. It created a significant distance between the Naxal leaders and the local community. Social pressure forced many naxalites to switch over to farming and shed off their association with naxal outfits.
Aasdwar project in Jehanabad (Bihar)
Under this project, 5 Naxalite affected panchayats (Jehanabad district of Bihar) are witnessing a flurry of development activities on a war footing e.g. construction of cement lanes, link roads, drains, buildings for schools and anganwadis, individual toilets etc. The people, at large, seem to have embraced the programme in a big way. So, as this case study amplifies, Naxalism can be defeated and eliminated by the process of development and a new social order but the change has to come from within.


Peace Talks with Maoists and cease fires
In 2004, Andhra Pradesh government entered into peace talks with the Maoist. Maoist showed unwavering stand and put up strange conditions, like they should be allowed to wield arms wherever they like, state should call back troops from their areas etc. It was clear that Maoist Plan for ultimate overthrow of Indian state is non-negotiable. They just wanted to buy time to strengthen themselves. During this time their Leader (Kishenji) addressed huge rally in Hyderabad (attended by approx. 1.5 lakh people). Soon after this, merger of two parties (MCC & PWG) surprised everyone.


Again in 2009, Home Minister P. Chidambaram called for ceasefire and peace talks, Maoist first accepted cease fire, but within few hours there was an attack on paramilitary battalion, killing them, which belied all expectations of peace with Maoists.


Surrender Policy
Naxal-affected states have also announced surrender policies.
The Jharkhand government offered Rs 50000 to surrendered Naxalites plus a monthly allowance of Rs.2000, one acre of agricultural land, and educational and health benefits to their children.


The Chhattisgarh government offered up to Rs.3 lakh for weapon surrender.


The Orissa government announced Rs. 10000 for surrender, Rs.20000 for arms surrender, and Rs 2 lakh of bank loan without interest for two years.


But there is no effective intelligence mechanism to identify Naxal cadres .Often, tribal youths surrender as Naxal cadres; many of them even join the Naxal movement to reap these benefits.


The LWE-affected States and the Home Ministry have framed policies for surrender and rehabilitation of Maoists. A screening-cum-rehabilitation committee examines the cases before enrolling them for the rehabilitation scheme.


Further it is alleged that Police forces pressurize (even coerce) those who surrendered to reveal information, or to join counter-Naxal operations like Salwa Judum. This demotivates rebels who want to surrender.


Lives claimed by Naxalism have come down drastically in recent years due to better center state cooperation. Recent Chhattisgarh and general elections were concluded peacefully and districts of Bastar and Dantewada too voted in reasonably good numbers. This indicates situation is under control for the time being. But as explained, government can’t be complacent until it is uprooted completely. There are still surprise attacks where they inflict substantial damage at our paramilitary forces. Their vigour of attack doesn’t suggest that they are demoralized, but it appears that they are waiting for the right time to raise their head. A time when Indian state is weak or engaged in external conflict, could be most opportune for them. Wait and patience is inherent in policies of Mao. So it is imperative that government instead of being reactionary goes after them proactively. But it has herculean challenge of doing it in democratic way.


It is obvious that there is (and should be) two pronged approach to counter it, one at ideological level and other at physical level. In former case, good governance by government and delivering good results in fields of Education, Health and overall standard of living will be instrumental.